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PREFACE 
In apprehending a scientific truth we pass, as a rule, through various degrees of 
certitude. Perhaps first conjectured on the basis of an insufficient number of particular 
cases, a general proposition comes to be more and more securely established by being 
connected with other truths through chains of inferences, whether consequences are 
derived from it that are confirmed in some other way or whether, conversely, it is seen 
to be a consequence of propositions already established. Hence we can inquire, on the 
one hand, how we have gradually arrived at a given proposition and, on the other, 
how we can finally provide it with the most secure foundation. The first question 
may have to be answered differently for different persons; the second is more definite, 
and the answer to it is connected with the inner nature of the proposition considered. 
The most reliable way of carrying out a proof, obviously, is to follow pure logic, a 
way that, disregarding the particular characteristics of objects, depends solely on those 
laws upon which all knowledge rests. Accordingly, we divide all truths that require 
justification into two kinds, those for which the proof can be carried out purely by 
means of logic and those for which it must be supported by facts of experience. But 
that a proposition is of the first kind is surely compatible with the fact that it could 
nevertheless not have come to consciousness in a human mind without any activity of 
the senses.1 Hence it is not the psychological genesis but the best method of proof that 
is at the basis of the classification. Now, when I came to consider the question to 
which of these two kinds the judgments of arithmetic belong, I first had to ascertain 
how far one could proceed in arithmetic by means of inferences alone, -with the sole 
support of those laws of thought that transcend all particulars. My initial step was 
to attempt to reduce the concept of ordering in a sequence to that of logical conse-
quence, so as to proceed from there to the concept of number. To prevent anything 
intuitive QAnschaulichesTj from penetrating here unnoticed, I had to bend every effort 
to keep the chain of inferences free of gaps. In attempting to comply with this require-
ment in the strictest possible way I found the inadequacy of language to be an 
1 Since without sensory experience no mental development is possible in the beings known to 
us, that holds of all judgments. 
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obstacle; no matter how unwieldy the expressions I was ready to accept, I was less 
and less able, as the relations became more and more complex, to attain the precision 
that my purpose required. This deficiency led me to the idea of the present ideography. 
Its first purpose, therefore, is to provide us with the most reliable test of the validity 
of a chain of inferences and to point out every presupposition that tries to sneak in 
unnoticed, so that its origin can be investigated. That is why I decided to forgo ex-
pressing anything that is without significance for the inferential sequence. In § 3 I 
called what alone mattered to me the conceptual content ][begrifflichen InhaU]\. Hence 
this definition must always be kept in mind if one wishes to gain a proper understand-
ing of what my formula language is. That, too, is what led me to the name "Begriffs-
schrift". Since I confined myself for the time being to expressing relations that are 
independent of the particular characteristics of objects, I was also able to use the 
expression "formula language for pure thought". That it is modeled upon the formula 
language of arithmetic, as I indicated in the title, has to do with fundamental ideas 
rather than with details of execution. Any effort to create an artificial similarity by 
regarding a concept as the sum of its marks pierkmalej] was entirely alien to my 
thought. The most immediate point of contact between my formula language and that 
of arithmetic is the way in which letters are employed. 
1 believe that I can best make the relation of my ideography to ordinary language 
[JSprache des LebensJ] clear if I compare it to that which the microscope has to the 
eye. Because of the range of its possible uses and the versatility with which it can 
adapt to the most diverse circumstances, the eye is far superior to the microscope. 
Considered as an optical instrument, to be sure, it exhibits many imperfections, which 
ordinarily remain unnoticed only on account of its intimate connection with our mental 
life. But, as soon as scientific goals demand great sharpness of resolution, the eye 
proves to be insufficient. The microscope, on the other hand, is perfectly suited to 
precisely such goals, but that is just why it is useless for all others. 
This ideography, likewise, is a device invented for certain scientific purposes, and 
one must not condemn it because it is not suited to others. If it answers to these 
purposes in some degree, one should not mind the fact that there are no new truths in 
my work. I would console myself on this point with the realization that a development 
of method, too, furthers science. Bacon, after all, thought it better to invent a means 
by which everything could easily be discovered than to discover particular truths, and 
all great steps of scientific progress in recent times have had their origin in an improve-
ment of method. 
Leibniz, too, recognized—and perhaps overrated—the advantages of an adequate 
system of notation. His idea of a universal characteristic, of a calculus philosophicus 
or ratiocinator,2 was so gigantic that the attempt to realize it could not go beyond the 
bare preliminaries. The enthusiasm that seized its originator when he contemplated 
the immense increase in the intellectual power of mankind that a system of notation 
directly appropriate to objects themselves would bring about led him to underestimate 
the difficulties that stand in the way of such an enterprise. But, even if this worthy 
goal cannot be reached in one leap, we need not despair of a slow, step-by-step approxi-
mation. When a problem appears to be unsolvable in its full generality, one should 
2 On that point see Trendelenburg 1867 Qj>p. 1-47, Ueber Leibnizens Entwurf einer allgemeinen 
Charakteristik]\. 
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temporarily restrict i t ; perhaps it can then be conquered by a gradual advance. It is 
possible to view the signs of arithmetic, geometry, and chemistry as realizations, for 
specific fields, of Leibniz's idea. The ideography proposed here adds a new one to these 
fields, indeed the central one, which borders on all the others. If we take our departure 
from there, we can with the greatest expectation of success proceed to fill the gaps in 
the existing formula languages, connect their hitherto separated fields into a single 
domain, and extend this domain to include fields that up to now have lacked such a 
language.3 
I am confident that my ideography can be successfully used wherever special value 
must be placed on the validity of proofs, as for example when the foundations of the 
differential and integral calculus are established. 
It seems to me to be easier still to extend the domain of this formula language to 
include geometry. We would only have to add a few signs for the intuitive relations 
that occur there. In this way we would obtain a kind of analysis situs. 
The transition to the pure theory of motion and then to mechanics and physics 
could follow at this point. The latter two fields, in which besides rational necessity 
[[Denknothwendigkeit]] empirical necessity [Naturnothwendigkehfj] asserts itself, are 
the first for which we can predict a further development of the notation as knowledge 
progresses. That is no reason, however, for waiting until such progress appears to 
have become impossible. 
If it is one of the tasks of philosophy to break the domination of the word over the 
human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often 
almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts and by freeing 
thought from that with which only the means of expression of ordinary language, 
constituted as they are, saddle it, then my ideography, further developed for these 
purposes, can become a useful tool for the philosopher. To be sure, it too will fail to 
reproduce ideas in a pure form, and this is probably inevitable when ideas are 
represented by concrete means; but, on the one hand, we can restrict the discrepancies 
to those that are unavoidable and harmless, and, on the other, the fact that they are 
of a completely different kind from those peculiar to ordinary language already affords 
protection against the specific influence that a particular means of expression might 
exercise. 
The mere invention of this ideography has, it seems to me, advanced logic. I hope 
that logicians, if they do not allow themselves to be frightened off by an initial im-
pression of strangeness, will not withhold their assent from the innovations that, by a 
necessity inherent in the subject matter itself, I was driven to make. These deviations 
from what is traditional find their justification in the fact that logic has hitherto always 
followed ordinary language and grammar too closely. In particular, I believe that the 
replacement of the concepts subject and predicate by argument and function, respec-
tively, will stand the test of time. I t is easy to see how regarding a content as a function 
of an argument leads to the formation of concepts. Furthermore, the demonstration 
of the connection between the meanings of the words if, and, not, or, there is, some, all, 
and so forth, deserves attention. 
Only the following point still requires special mention. The restriction, in § 6, to a 
3 [[On that point see Frege IS7°a.TJ 
8 FREGE 
single mode of inference is justified by the fact that, when the foundations for such an 
ideography are laid, the primitive components must be taken as simple as possible, if 
perspicuity and order are to be created. This does not preclude the possibility that 
later certain transitions from several judgments to a new one, transitions that this 
one mode of inference would not allow us to carry out except mediately, will be 
abbreviated into immediate ones. In fact this would be advisable in case of eventual 
application. In this way, then, further modes of inference would be created. 
I noticed afterward that formulas (31) and (41) can be combined into a single one, 
| ( T t a = a), 
which makes some further simplifications possible. 
As I remarked at the beginning, arithmetic was the point of departure for the train 
of thought that led me to my ideography. And that is why I intend to apply it first of 
all to that science, attempting to provide a more detailed analysis of the concepts of 
arithmetic and a deeper foundation for its theorems. For the present I have reported 
in the third chapter some of the developments in this direction. To proceed farther 
along the path indicated, to elucidate the concepts of number, magnitude, and so 
forth—all this will be the object of further investigations, which I shall publish 
immediately after this booklet. 
Jena, 18 December 1878. 
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